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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a direct measure of efficiency to examine the
relationship between market structure and the performance of
brokerage houses in Turkey. This methodology involves two
stages: First, a stochastic translog cost frontier is specified to
obtain a direct measure of efficiency. Second, this measure is
included in a profitability equation along with market concentra-
tion and market share variables. These two equations are then
estimated using quarterly data from 112 brokerage houses for the
period 2008–2015. The results show that the efficiency of broker-
age houses does not influence profitability when measured dir-
ectly. Market share, on the other hand, is found to be one of the
main determinants of profitability, providing support for the rela-
tive market power hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
Numerous studies have investigated the factors influencing firm profitability. These
studies have generally found a positive relationship between market concentration
and performance. Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain this relation-
ship: the traditional ‘structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis’, which is based
on market power, and the ‘efficient structure hypothesis’, which is based
on efficiency.
Mason (1939, 1949) and Bain (1951, 1956) introduced the SCP hypothesis, also
known as the ‘collusion hypothesis.’ A slightly different version of this hypothesis
also exists, known as the ‘relative market power hypothesis’ (Shepherd, 1983, 1986).
Demsetz (1973, 1974) developed the efficient structure hypothesis in response to the
traditional collusion hypothesis.
According to the SCP hypothesis, concentration reduces the cost of collusion
among incumbent firms, securing supranormal profits (Smirlock, 1985). The efficient
structure hypothesis, on the other hand, asserts that the observed correlation between
profitability and concentration is spurious, as concentration is a result of a given
CONTACT Eyup Kadioglu eyup.kadioglu@gmail.com
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA
2019, VOL. 32, NO. 1, 1583–1601
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1638282
firm’s degree of efficiency. Highly efficient firms increase their market share (and, in
turn, their concentration), and become more profitable (Demsetz, 1974). Therefore,
the relation between profitability and concentration is spurious, and profitability is, in
fact, an outcome of efficiency.
The relative market power (RMP) hypothesis argues that firms with large market
shares might use their power to determine prices and make profits. According to this
hypothesis, such firms increase in their profits through high quality service and dif-
ferentiated products with higher prices. Therefore, individual market share brings
market power and market imperfections.
Studies testing the traditional market power hypothesis and the efficient structure
hypothesis for the banking sector include Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984);
Smirlock (1985); Evanoff and Fortier (1988); Molyneux (1993); Lloyd-Williams,
Molyneux, and Thornton (1994); Altunbas and Molyneux (1994); Goldberg and Rai
(1996); Berger and Humphrey (1997); Maudos (1998); Aguirre and Lee (2001); Punt
and van Rooij (2003); Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, and Perez (2005); Jeon and
Miller (2005); Molyneux and Forbes (1995); Casu and Girardone (2006);
Mahathanaseth and Tauer (2012); Garza-Garcia (2012); Trujillo-Ponce (2013); Mirzaei,
Moore, and Liu (2013); Bello and Isola (2014); Chan, Koh, Zainir, and Yong (2015);
Talpur, Shah, Pathan, and Halepoto (2016) and Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, and
Kozłowski (2017). Similarly, studies carried out for the Turkish financial sector include
Denizer and Cilli (1989); Molyneux (1993); Okumus¸ (2002); G€unalp and C¸elik (2004);
C¸elik and Kaplan (2007); Sayılgan and Yıldırım (2009); Aydemir (2013); Sekmen,
Akkus, and Siklar (2015) and C¸elik, Kaplan, and S¸ahin (2015).
Most banking studies have used market share as a proxy for efficiency in regressions.
It is assumed that more efficient firms operate at lower cost, thereby capturing a greater
market share. On the other hand, some economists have criticised the use of market
share as a proxy for efficiency, arguing that the market share variable is likely to reflect
not only the effects of efficiency, but also the effects of other variables (Berger, 1995).
In this paper, it is aimed to examine the relationship between market structure
and profitability of brokerage houses in Turkey using a direct measure of efficiency.
Although there is a vast amount of empirical literature that examines the efficiency
and profitability of banking systems, there exist only a few empirical studies dealing
with the efficiency and productivity of brokerage houses. To the best of our know-
ledge, there has been no previous work in the literature investigating empirically the
profitability of brokerage houses. This subject is of great importance because many of
the emerging markets have still protective measures in their financial markets
although they are now faced with more pressures to reform their financial markets
and remain competitive in the global economy. In Turkey, the number of brokerage
houses has not increased since 1997 because the Capital Market Board (CMB) has
not allowed the establishment of new brokerage houses; the only way to enter the
market is to buy an existing brokerage house. This has constituted a legally enforced
barrier to entry in the market. The results of this study, therefore, may provide us
valuable insights into the impact of policy makers and regulators in emerging markets
on the performance of financial institutions and the market when they engage in pro-
tectionist practices to limit competition.
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The study utilizes the stochastic frontier approach to estimate a direct measure of
efficiency of Turkish brokerage houses. More specifically, we estimate a translog
cost frontier function to obtain efficiency scores of brokerage houses. These effi-
ciency scores then enter into the profitability equation as an explanatory variable
along with other independent variables. The results of the paper suggest that the
relative market power hypothesis is strongly supported in the Turkish brokerage
house sector when efficiency is measured directly. The brokerage houses with large
market shares seem to use their market power to determine prices and make profits
during the period under study. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2
provides background information on Turkish capital markets and the development
of brokerage houses in the sector. Section 3 outlines the hypotheses on the relation-
ship between market structure and performance. Section 4 describes the measure-
ment of efficiency. The cost and profitability equations are specified in Section 5.
Section 6 presents and discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. An overview of the brokerage house sector in Turkey
Turkish financial markets are divided into three functional categories: insurance, cap-
ital market and banking. Generally, financial institutions in the capital market sector
cannot operate in the banking and insurance markets or vice versa. Despite this seg-
regation, universal banking takes place more and more within the system. Brokerage
houses in Turkey have been operating since the establishment of the Istanbul Stock
Exchange in 1986, and all brokerage houses are members of the exchange. The
Istanbul Stock Exchange was converted from a public organisation to a private firm
and renamed Borsa Istanbul with the amendment of the new Capital Market Law
in 2013.
The Turkish equity market includes two main types of intermediaries: banks and
brokerage houses. Banks are not permitted to trade shares on exchanges in the sec-
ondary market. Brokerage houses can engage in several activities such as intermedi-
ation for the trade of capital market instruments in the secondary market and the
issue of public offerings of capital market instruments. Furthermore, brokerage
houses may also conduct the repurchase and reverse repurchase of capital market
instruments, investment consultancy and portfolio management. The function of
intermediary institutions outlined in Turkish capital market regulations is similar to
that of the United States, which broadly encompasses the operations of brokers, deal-
ers, underwriters and investment bankers (€Unal, 2008).
According to Turkish capital market regulations, brokerage houses must be
established as joint-stock companies, and their capital must be in the form of regis-
tered shares. This capital must be fully paid and not to be less than the amount
determined by the CMB. In addition, its founders must not have been subject to
any legal prosecution due to bankruptcy or other felony. The establishment of
brokerage houses is contingent on the approval of the CMB (Bagdadioglu, Dinc¸er,
& Yereli, 2012). The CMB has not permitted the establishment of new brokerage
houses since 1997. The only way to enter the market is to buy an existing brokerage
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house. It should also be noted that although more than 100 brokerage houses oper-
ate in the market, only 5 are listed on Borsa Istanbul.
In order to perform intermediation activities, brokerage houses have to obtain a
certificate of activity from the CMB. Table 1 shows the number of certificates
obtained by brokerage houses in each category.
Table 2 presents the development of the number of banks and brokerage houses
in Turkey.
When the Borsa Istanbul was established in 1986, the number of brokerage houses
was around 10. This number increased to 130 by 2001. It then dropped following the
financial crisis of 2001, declining to 108 in 2005. The number of brokerage houses
was 100 in 2011 and 95 in 2015. As seen in Table 2, the number of brokerage houses
has not increased over the years because there has been an entry barrier to the mar-
ket since 1997. Table 3 shows the branch network of brokerage houses.
Brokerage houses use three types of networks to reach customers: their own
branches, representative offices and bank branches (bank-originated brokerage houses
rely mainly on their related bank branches). The number of brokerage house
branches reached 323 in 2015 compared to 242 branches in 2001, indicating an
increase by 33%. The number of bank branches, on the other hand, has increased by
47% since 2001.
Table 4 displays the development of total assets in the financial sector and the
market capitalisation of companies that are listed on Borsa Istanbul. As seen in the
table, the banking sector dominates the financial market. As brokerage houses mainly
provide trading services in exchange for commission, most of their holdings are cli-
ents’ assets. It can also be observed that the market capitalisation and transaction vol-
ume has increased over time.
The income of brokerage houses comes primarily from commission collected as a
fraction of clients’ trading transactions. The regulatory authority, CMB, imposed a
minimum commission rate of 0.2% in 1997. The brokerage houses were allowed to
pay back 35% of the commission to their clients in 2002. The payback ratio was 50%
in 2003 and 75% in 2004. The limitations on commission paybacks were lifted after
2006. The minimum limit of commission rates, which are taken at the time of trans-
action, however, is still in force and brokerage houses are allowed to pay back some
part of the commission.
As seen in Table 4, the volume of transactions has increased steadily. Annual daily
trading volume was 642.80 million TL as of end of 2001 and 8,052.84 million TL at
the end of 2015, which is more than a 10-fold increase.
Table 5 displays some selected financial indicators of brokerage houses.
Table 1. Number of certificate of activity held by brokerage houses.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Exchange intermediary 123 117 101 99 98 100 100 95
Credit-based security 98 99 98 96 97 95 94 84
Public offerings 81 64 59 61 55 55 58 53
Portfolio management 64 59 57 59 52 49 53 45
Investment consultancy 62 54 57 59 59 57 55 52
Derivative transaction 29 5 42 63 68 81 81 82
Sources: Bagdadioglu et al. (2012), TSPAKB (www.tspakb.org.tr).
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It is observed in Table 5 that the total assets of brokerage houses increased from
950 million TL in 2001 to 3,841 million TL in 2007 and to 15,312 million TL in
2015. The shareholders’ equity climbed at a similar rate during the same period, while
return on equity (ROE) and return on asset (ROA) declined from 2001 to 2015. The
current ratio has declined slightly since 2001. The ratio of shareholder equity to total
assets was 60% in 2001 and 69% in 2003. This ratio dropped to 26% in 2015. Table 5
reveals that the financial indicators of the brokerage houses did not deteriorate during
the financial crisis in the banking sector in 2009 as much as they did in 2001. Short-
term liabilities increased nearly 100% from 2001 to 2015. Throughout the period, the
Table 2. Number of banks and brokerage houses in Turkey.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Brokerage houses 130 117 108 104 103 100 100 95
Banks 56 44 41 41 41 40 41 44
Total 186 161 149 145 144 140 141 139
Source: www.spk.gov.tr.
Table 3. Branch network of brokerage houses in Turkey.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Branches 242 227 234 231 157 159 153 323
Liaison offices 91 73 69 52 39 61 71 76
Bank branches 3,813 3,688 4,406 4,775 5,988 6,466 6,950 5,763
Total 4,146 3,988 4,709 5,058 6,184 6,686 7,174 6,162
Source: TSPAKB (www.tspakb.org.tr).
Table 4. Total assets of banks and brokerage houses, and equity market transaction volume and
market capitalisation of Borsa Istanbul (Million TL).
Year Total assets of banks
Total assets of
brokerage houses
Borsa Istanbul equity
market daily
transaction volume
Market capitalisation
of listed companies in
Borsa Istanbul
2001 169,221 950 642.80 68,603
2003 249,750 1,295 1,172.27 96,073
2005 396,970 2,565 2,161.89 218,318
2007 561,172 3,841 3,095.72 335,948
2009 798,533 5,972 3,854.18 350,761
2011 1,160,712 8,049 5,525.22 381,152
2013 1,732,401 13,987 6,495.59 507,700
2015 2,357,452 15,312 8,052.84 554,884
Sources: TSPAKB (www.tspakb.org.tr), SPK (www.spk.gov.tr), TBB (www.tbb.org.tr).
Table 5. Financial indicators of brokerage houses.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
TL / USD (Dec, 31) 1.45 1.39 1.34 1.16 1.49 1.89 2.13 2.92
Total assets (m TL) 950 1,295 2,565 3,841 5,972 8,049 13,987 15,312
Equity (m TL) 574 896 1,501 1,942 2,153 2,769 3,337 4,100
Net profit (m TL) 218 137 273 310 317 414 529 432
Equity / T. assets (CA) 0.60 0.69 0.59 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.24 0.26
Net Profit/ T. assets ( ROA) 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
Net Profit/Equity (ROE) 0.28 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.11
Equity / T. liabilities 1.53 2.24 1.41 1.02 0.56 0.52 0.31 0.74
Current ratio 2.16 2.45 2.40 2.06 1.40 1.40 1.23 1.27
Sh. Tr. Lia./ T. assets 0.38 0.29 0.35 0.43 0.63 0.65 0.76 0.73
Ln. Tr. Lia / T. assets 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Source: TSPAKB (www.tspakb.org.tr).
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short-term debt-to-equity ratio increased while the ratio of long-term debt-to-equity
decreased. Meanwhile, the profitability of brokerage houses decreased significantly.
3. The hypotheses on the relationship between market structure and
performance
To test the collusion hypothesis against the efficient structure hypothesis, this study
estimates two models given by Equations (1) and (2). The first model (Bagdadioglu
et al., 2012; Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994; Maudos, 1998; Molyneux & Forbes, 1995;
Punt & van Rooij, 2003; Smirlock, 1985; Vander Vennet, 1993; Weiss, 1974) uses a
market-share variable as a proxy for efficiency. The second model uses a direct meas-
ure of efficiency.
p ¼ b0 þ b1CRþ b2MSþ a0X þ u (1)
p ¼ b0 þ b1CRþ b2MSþ b3EF þ a0X þ u (2)
In both models, p represents the performance of brokerage house (with return on
equity – ROE as a proxy). MS represents the market share of a given brokerage
house, while CR represents market concentration. X is a vector containing sector- or
brokerage house-specific control variables. Finally, EF is a direct efficiency measure
obtained from the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier.
In the first model, if b^1 is positive and statistically significant b^2 equals zero, then
it can be concluded that the results give support to the SCP hypothesis. On the other
hand, if b^2 is positive and statistically significant while b^1 equals zero, then the
results confirm the efficient structure hypothesis. Based on the sign and significance
of the coefficients in Equation (2), the results could support the SCP hypothesis, the
efficient structure hypothesis, the relative market power hypothesis or the modified
efficient structure hypothesis (Gumbau & Maudos, 2000; Maudos, 1998; Timme &
Yang, 1991).
In the second model, if concentration is the only factor determining the perform-
ance of brokerage houses, then result traditional SCP hypothesis is supported. On the
other hand, if profitability is explained only by the direct measure of efficiency, then
efficient structure hypothesis is supported. The modified efficient structure hypothesis
(Shepherd, 1986) asserts that profitability is explained by efficiency as well as by the
residual influence of market share, whereas concentration has no direct influence on
profitability. The reason for the latter is that market share captures the influence of
factors such as product differentiation and/or market power, which are unrelated
to efficiency.
In case of market share is the sole determinant of the profitability of a firm, b^1
and b^3 equal zero, b^2 is positive and statistically significant, then it can be concluded
that the results give support to the relative market power hypothesis. The relative
market power hypothesis states that firms having a high proportion of market share
and effective product differentiation use their market power to determine their own
products’ prices, therefore earning supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1983). The
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difference between the traditional SCP hypothesis and the relative market power
hypothesis is that, according to the latter, the advantages gained from size may exist
even in markets that are not concentrated.
Over the past 15 years, the number of studies testing these hypotheses for financial
sectors by using a direct measure of efficiency has increased. Examples include
Aguirre and Lee (2001), Timme and Yang (1991),Vander Vennet (1993), Goldberg
and Rai (1996), Maudos (1998), Gumbau and Maudos (2000), Okumus¸ (2002),
G€unalp and C¸elik (2004), Mensi and Zouari (2010), Ayg€oren and Yes¸ilyurt (2011),
Das and Drine (2011), Ye, Xu, and Fang (2012), Garza-Garcia (2012), C¸elik et al.
(2015), Zhao and Kang (2015) and Alhassan, Tetteh, and Brobbey (2016). Some of
these and some other have formulated a profitability equation for the banking sector
and include a direct measure of X-efficiency (inefficiency) as an independent variable
(Alhassan et al., 2016; Ye et al., 2012). The studies of Goldberg and Rai (1996),
Maudos (1998) and G€unalp and C¸elik (2004) used the stochastic frontier approach
for the measurement of efficiency (inefficiency), and they assumed a half-normal dis-
tribution for the inefficiency term. Meanwhile, many other efficiency studies of the
banking sector, do not necessarily estimate a profitability equation. A summary of
studies related to efficiency of financial institutions can be found in Bauer, Berger,
and Humphrey (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Fethi and Pasiouras (2010).
Studies investigating the efficiency of brokerage houses in Turkey as well as in
other countries are scant. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), G€und€uz,
Yılmaz, and Yılmaz (2001) found that only half of the brokerage houses operating
in the Turkish brokerage house sector in 1997 and 1998 were efficient. Aktas¸ and
Kargın (2007) analysed the efficiency of brokerage houses in Turkey by using
DEA and found that efficiency declined over the period 2000–2005. Ayg€oren and
Yes¸ilyurt (2011) found that the age of brokerage houses and the number of
employees have positive impact on efficiency while other firm attributes such as
the number of branches, firm size, financial leverage, and service ratio have a
negative impact on the efficiency of brokerage houses. Bagdadioglu et al. (2012)
used DEA to calculate efficiency during the period 2000–2008. They found that
the Turkish brokerage house sector has very low efficiency scores and concluded
that the main sources of inefficiency were managerial incompetence at the individ-
ual brokerage house level.
4. The measurement of efficiency
In this study, the term efficiency refers to the concept of X-efficiency, which includes
both technical and allocative efficiencies. Technical efficiency means minimising the
amount of inputs used to produce a given level of outputs or maximising the amount
of outputs produced for a given amount of inputs. Allocative efficiency involves using
the right combination of inputs to produce a given level of output at the lowest cost.
Cost efficiency is achieved when both technical and allocative efficiencies are present.
X-efficiency is directly linked to managerial skills for controlling costs. Therefore,
X-efficiency includes both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. If technical
inefficiency is present, a firm operates under its production possibilities frontier,
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while in the presence of allocative inefficiency, even if the firm operates on the pro-
duction possibilities frontier, it is not able to minimise its costs. In estimating X-effi-
ciency, this study uses the stochastic frontier approach developed by Aigner, Lovell,
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This approach involves
formulating a stochastic cost frontier function in the following form:
lnCi ¼ lnC yi;wið Þ þ ei; ei ¼ lnui þ lnvi; i ¼ 1; :::;N (3)
Here, lnCi is the natural logarithm of the observed costs of firm i; yi is the output
vector and wi is the vector of input prices. The compound error term, ei; consists of
two components: a one-sided error term (ui), and a symmetric, purely random com-
ponent (vi). The variable ui reflects managerial and other inefficiencies that are
within the firm’s control. The variable vi; on the other hand, reflects omitted varia-
bles, measurement error and stochastic elements beyond managerial control (Berger
& Humphrey, 1997). The variable ui is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution.
It is the absolute value of a variable that is distributed as a normal with mean zero
and variance r2u: On the other hand, vi is assumed to be drawn from a normal distri-
bution with mean zero and variance r2v: Thus, ui cannot have a negative value, while
vi can have either a negative or a positive value.
Assuming that both components of the compound error term are distributed inde-
pendently, the frontier function can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
Inefficiency scores then could be derived from the residuals of the regression. The
log-likelihood function of the model can be written as follows:
lnL ¼ N
2
ln
2
p
 Nlnr 1
2r2
XN
i¼1
e2i þ
XN
i¼1
lnU eik=rð Þ (4)
In Equation (4), k equals ru=rv while r2 equals to r2u þ r2v: In the same equation, N
shows the number of firms, and U represents the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. Individual inefficiency estimates can be computed using the distribution of the
inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the compound error term. Jondrow,
Knox Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) demonstrated that for the half-normal distri-
bution, the mean of this conditional distribution is given by the following expression:
Ε uijei½  ¼ rk
1þ k2ð Þ
/ eik=rð Þ
U eik=rð Þ
eik
r
 
(5)
In Equation (5) / and U are the standard normal density and cumulative distribu-
tion functions, respectively. The values of the parameters in this equation can be
obtained from the maximum likelihood estimation in Equation (4). Thus, it is pos-
sible to calculate an estimate for the expected value of ui: In other words, individual
inefficiency estimates can be calculated using Equation (5). Our primary goal is to
obtain the efficiency scores of brokerage houses that form the variable EF in our
profitability equation. Hence, the next task is to calculate efficiency scores using the
translog cost function.
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Based on the estimation of a particular functional form for the cost function, C yi;wið Þ;
in Equation (3), cost efficiency is measured as the ratio between the minimum costs (Cmini )
necessary to produce the output vector and the costs actually incurred (Ci):
EFi ¼ C
min
i
Ci
¼ exp lnC yi;wið Þ
 
exp lnvi½ 
exp lnC yi;wið Þ
 
exp lnui½  exp lnvi½  ¼ exp lnui½  (6)
An efficiency value of EFi implies that without any inefficiency, it would be pos-
sible for a brokerage house to produce the same vector of production, saving
(1 EFi)100 percent of the costs. The efficiency variable takes its maximum value
for the best-practice brokerage house in the sample. Efficiencies of brokerage houses
are expressed in raw scores, and no standardisation procedure is applied to them.
Therefore, efficiency scores can take zero and positive values.
5. The specification of cost and profitability equations
This study uses a translog cost function to estimate the efficiency variable (EF). A
translog cost function provides a local, second-order approximation in logarithms to
any arbitrary twice-differentiable cost function.
Assuming that brokerage houses operating in Turkish capital markets produce one
output by using three inputs, the translog cost function takes the following form:
lnCit ¼ b0 þ
X3
k¼1
bklnwkit þ
1
2
X3
k¼1
X3
j¼1
bkjln wkitln wjit þ bylnyit
þ 1
2
byy lnyitð Þ2 þ
X3
k¼1
bkylnwkitlnyit þ aBi þ cFi þ eit (7)
In line with the intermediation approach, total costs (Cit) include both operational
and non-operational costs while output is assumed to be trading volume. In banking
studies, total costs are divided into two categories: interest expenses and non-interest
expenses. However, the income statement of brokerage houses differs from that of
banks. Brokerage houses trade securities for their own portfolio as well as for their
customers. Therefore, the total costs of brokerage houses should include all expenses,
namely, the cost of sales, operating expenses, expenses and losses from other opera-
tions, financial expenses, extraordinary expenses and losses. Here, the cost of sales
and operating expenses are regarded as operating costs while other expenses are con-
sidered non-operating costs for brokerage houses. The definitions of all variables in
our translog cost function are given below:
C ¼ Total Cost
cost of salesþ operating expenses þ expenses and losses from other operationsð Þ:
y ¼ Output total trading volumeð Þ
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Following Aslan, Koksal, and Ocal (2011), Aktas¸ and Kargın (2007) and
Bagdadioglu et al. (2012), the total trading volume is used to represent the output of
brokerage houses. The brokerage houses are assumed to produce their output by
using three inputs: labour, capital and short/long long-term financial debts (without
provisions). The prices of these inputs are defined as follows:
w1 ¼ Price of Labour ðpersonnel expenses=number of personnelÞ:
w2 ¼ Price of Capital ((expenses and losses from other operationsþ extraordinary
expenses and lossesþ amortisation expenses)/(tangible fixed assets)).
w3 ¼ Price of Financial Debt ((financial expenses/(total liabilities - provisions)).
The variables F and B; the foreign-owned and bank-owned brokerage house
dummy variables are defined as follows:
F ¼1 if majority of shareholders are foreigners
0 if majority of shareholders are nationals
B ¼1 if brokerage house is a subsidiary of a bank
0 if brokerage house is not a subsidiary of a bank
Dummy variable B is included in the model to control for the fact that the cost
structures of bank-owned brokerage houses could be different because they can use
all the branches of the owner banks at no cost as their own branches. Dummy vari-
able F; on the other hand, is added because the brokerage houses with foreign major-
ity shareholders could gain a cost advantage by using their foreign owners’
established technological and institutional infrastructure in their home countries.
As will be explained in detail below, efficiency scores for brokerage houses can be
obtained from the translog cost function (Equation (7)) by using the stochastic fron-
tier approach. In the estimation of our stochastic translog cost function, we will
impose the usual symmetry and homogeneity conditions:
bkj ¼ bjk (symmetry condition)
X3
k¼1
bk ¼ 1
X3
k¼1
bkj ¼ 0 j ¼ 1; 2; 3 (homogeneity conditions)
X3
k¼1
bky ¼ 0
Cost and input prices are normalised by the price of labour (w1) to impose linear
homogeneity restrictions.
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The extended version of the profitability equation (Equation (2)), can be rewritten
by explicitly specifying the control variables in vector X:
pit ¼ b0 þ b1CR3t þ b2MSit þ b3EFit þ a1CAit þ a2TA1it þ a3GRTVt þ uit (8)
where
p ¼ ROE: Return on equity of the ith brokerage house (net income/total equity),
CR3: Three-firm (brokerage house) concentration ratio based on total assets,
MS: Market share of the ith brokerage house in terms of total assets,
EF: Efficiency score of the ith brokerage house that is derived from the estimation of
translog cost function,
CA: Ratio of equity to total assets ratio of the ith brokerage house (owner’s equity/
total assets),
TA: Total assets of the ith brokerage house, and
GRTV: Growth rate of daily trading volume of Borsa Istanbul
This study uses ROE to measure performance, which was proposed by Evanoff and
Fortier (1988) and is commonly used in empirical studies on financial institutions
such as Punt and van Rooij (2003), Mensi and Zouari (2010), Aslan et al. (2011),
Garza-Garcia (2012), Akbas¸ (2012), Ye et al. (2012) and Alhassan et al. (2016).
Because ROE is defined as net income divided by total equity, it is a comparable
measure of performance for brokerage houses. The hypotheses on variables CR3; MS
and EF and the theoretical rationale behind them have been explained in Section 3.
The ratio of capital to total assets (CA) is introduced into the model in order to
reflect the differences in risk levels of brokerage houses. The inclusion of this variable
accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is not risk-adjusted. A lower CA
value reflects a higher risk since it implies a higher liability to total assets ratio. In
other words, a significant portion of the assets of brokerage houses is financed by
debt. A lower level of CA may affect profitability in two ways: First, clients may not
wish to work with a high-risk brokerage house. A brokerage house with high risk is
likely to lose clients, which affects profitability negatively. Second, such a brokerage
house would access to lines of credit under less favourable conditions. It may be sub-
ject to a higher interest rate due to a higher risk premium, implying greater financial
expenses and lower profitability. Hence, the coefficient for this variable is expected to
be positive. In other words, a higher CA ratio leads to higher profitability.
The total assets variable is included in the model to control for potential size
effects due to economies of scale. In addition, the services of large-scale brokerage
houses are possibly more diversified, which implies lower risk. Their larger number
of customers increases their trading volume. Therefore, the total assets (TA) variable
is expected to be positively associated with the dependent variable. However, because
the correlation between total assets and market share variables is very high in our
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sample (0.907), as in the studies of Okumus¸ (2002) and G€unalp and C¸elik (2004), the
inverse of total assets (1=TA) is included instead of total assets in order to avoid a
multicollinearity problem (the correlation between 1=TA and market share falls to
-0.1447). After inversing total assets, the data becomes very small; therefore, the
inverse of total assets variable (1=TA) is expressed in millions. Needless to say, in
contrast to the coefficient of TA; the coefficient of 1=TA is expected to be negative.
The final control variable in the model is the growth rate of Borsa Istanbul’s trad-
ing volume (GRTV). As Borsa Istanbul stock trading volume is generated by broker-
age houses, it is expected that a high rate of growth will positively affect the
profitability of brokerage houses.
6. Data and econometric results
This study utilises quarterly unbalanced panel data of Turkish brokerage houses for
the period between 2008.Q1 and 2015.Q1. These data have been drawn from the web-
site of The Association of Capital Market Intermediary Institutions of Turkey
(TCMA). The TCMA publishes quarterly detailed balance sheet and income state-
ment of brokerage houses that are prepared according to International Financial
Reporting Standards. TCMA also publishes the number of employees, trading volume
and personnel expenses. The sample is composed of 112 brokerage houses, of which
22 are subsidiary of a bank and 15 are mainly owned by foreigners in 20151.
Table 6 gives the results of estimating the translog cost function (Equation (7)). It
is seen from Table 6 that the output and capital elasticities are positive, as expected,
while the financial debt elasticity is negative but insignificant. As for the dummy vari-
ables, the coefficient of B is unexpectedly negative, though it is statistically insignifi-
cant. The negative and highly significant coefficient on F implies, on the other hand,
that foreign-owned brokerage houses have cost advantages over their domestic
counterparts.
Table 7 presents the yearly average efficiency scores for the sample period. As can
be seen from the table, the average cost efficiency of the sector declines during
Table 6. Estimation results of translog cost function.
Variable Coefficient z-ratio p-value
Constant 4.95 23.79 0.000
lnðyÞ 0.841 9.65 0.000
lnðw2=w1Þ 0.107 2.56 0.011
lnðw3=w1Þ 0.014 0.59 0.557
lnðyÞð Þ2 0.032 9.65 0.000
lnðw2=w1Þlnðw2=w1Þ 0.0004 0.03 0.975
lnðw2=w1Þlnðw3=w1Þ 0.032 3.26 0.001
lnðw3=w1Þlnðw3=w1Þ 0.0008 0.21 0.830
lnðw2=w1ÞlnðyÞ 0.015 1.02 0.307
lnðw3=w1ÞlnðyÞ 0.032 4.98 0.000
B 0.061 0.22 0.829
F 1.609 3.56 0.000
Log likelihood 3,619.45
Wald stat. 366.19 0.0000
Sample size 2576
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(C/w1).shows 1% significance level.
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2008–2011 while it slightly increases during 2012–2015; overall, it decreases during
the period under examination. The sharp decline in efficiency in 2010 is probably
due to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. The brokerage house sector began to
recover gradually after 2011. However, the average efficiency of the sector remained
below its pre-crisis level as of 2015.
Table 8 presents the estimation results of the profitability equation. In column
(A), we report the fixed-effects (FE) estimates of Equation (8) without a direct
measure of efficiency, which is the most commonly used specification in the lit-
erature to test the hypotheses on the relationship between market power and per-
formance. Column (B) shows the results of the same equation with a direct
measure of efficiency (EF). In order to check for the presence of endogeneity in
our models, we apply the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Hausman,
1978; Wu, 1973). For both models (with and without variable EF), the test produ-
ces a chi-square value which is statistically significant at a critical value below 1%;
hence, we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Therefore, the equations are
estimated also by the two-stage least squares (2SLS) fixed-effects model. For the
2SLS fixed-effects model, all of the explanatory variables are treated as endogen-
ous, and their first differences are used as instruments (so that our equations are
exactly identified). Columns (C) and (D) present 2SLS fixed-effects estimates of
Table 7. Efficiency scores (yearly averages).
Efficiency
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
2576 75.78 146.54
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Avg. Eff. 92.51 91.77 70.88 65.13 68.55 69.92 73.56 76.40
Table 8. Estimation results of profitability equation.
Fixed-Effects Estimations 2SLS Fixed-Effects Estimations
Variable A B C D
Constant 0.042
(-0.57)
0.046
(-0.62)
CR3 0.048
(-0.37)
0.044
(-0.034)
0.218
(-0.72)
0.132
(-0.41)
MS 1.350
(2.95)
1.382
(3.10)
7.012
(3.65)
6.803
(3.55)
CA 0.093
(6.52)
0.110
(7.30)
0.28
(7.38)
0.28
(6.97)
1/TA 0.004
(-12.48)
0.006
(-13.21)
0.005
(-8.24)
0.007
(-7.82)
GRTV 0.015
(1.07)
0.017
(1.22)
0.012
(-0.62)
0.009
(-0.45)
EF 0.000015
(0.91)
0.000047
(0.25)
Overall R-squared 0.1513 0.1482
F stat. 35.46 33.36 20.80 14.42
Durbin-Wu-Hausman v2 stat. 42.79 30.66
Cragg-Donald F stat. 32.25 33.65
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: p ¼ ROE, (2) z-values are shown in parentheses.  shows 1% significance level,  shows
5% significance level (3) Columns (A) and (C) present the estimations without the direct measure of efficiency while col-
umns (B) and (D) presents the estimations with the variable EF, the direct measure of efficiency). (4) Columns (A) and
(B) report fixed-effects estimation results, and columns (C) and (D) report 2SLS fixed-effects estimation results.
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Equation (8). When there are multiple endogenous regressors, the Cragg and
Donald (1993) F-test can be used to assess whether the instruments used are
weak. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide critical values for this test that depend on
the number of endogenous regressors, the number of instruments, and the desired
maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS. Given our number of endogen-
ous regressors and the number of instruments, the Cragg-Donald F-test results
suggest that our instruments are not weak in both models at the %5 level of sig-
nificance (even when the desired maximal bias is set at the 5% level). Similar to
FE estimations, model (D) is different from model (C) in that it involves a direct
measure of efficiency (EF). As explained above, the values of variable EF are
obtained from estimating the stochastic translog cost frontier specified in
Equation (7).
The F statistics in Table 8 show that all four models are, overall, highly significant.
It is also seen that the FE estimations results are qualitatively similar to those
obtained from the 2SLS FE estimations. Columns (A) and (C) include no direct
measure of efficiency, and, as in traditional studies, the efficiency of brokerage houses
is represented by the market share variable (MS). The model represented in these col-
umns is comparable with earlier studies in the literature testing for the collusion and
efficient structure hypotheses. It is seen that the coefficient of market share (MS) is
positive and highly significant while the coefficient of market concentration (CR3) is
insignificant. Such a result has generally been interpreted as support of the efficient
structure hypothesis because the markets share variable is considered to be a proxy
for efficiency. As pointed out by Berger (1995), however, if the coefficient of market
share maintains its sign and significance when a direct measure of efficiency is intro-
duced into the model, the market share variable should not be interpreted as a proxy
of efficiency, but rather as capturing the effect of factors other than efficiency.
Therefore, our results (estimates in columns (B) and (D) where there is a direct
measure of efficiency and where the variable MS still maintains its sign and signifi-
cance) indicate that it is inappropriate to use the market share variable as a proxy
for efficiency.
Estimates (B) and (D) include a direct measure of efficiency (EF). It is observed
from these estimations that the coefficient of MS is still highly significant and positive
while the coefficients of both CR3 and EF are insignificant. These results show that
among the four hypotheses, the relative market power hypothesis is supported for the
brokerage house sector in Turkey. The efficient structure, the structure-conduct-per-
formance and the modified efficient structure hypotheses, on the other hand, are
rejected. A positive relationship between ROE and market share in Turkish banking
sector was also found in the study of Akbas¸ (2012).
Similar findings from the FE and the 2SLS FE estimations would suggest that the
relative market power hypothesis is found a strong support for the Turkish brokerage
house sector. Therefore, it seems that the brokerage houses with large market share
might use their market power to determine prices and make profits. Although there
are no other profitability studies on the Turkish brokerage sector, the findings of this
paper could be compared to the results of studies carried out for the Turkish banking
industry. For example, a study by Denizer and Cilli (1989) found that over the period
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1986–1988, the profitability of Turkish banks was explained mainly by the traditional
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. Similarly, Sekmen et al. (2015) found that
Turkish banking sector operates under conditions of monopolistic competition and
Aydemir (2013, 2014) states that Turkish banks appear to have exercised collusive
pricing during 2000–2011. Denizer and Cilli (1989) used market share of banks as a
proxy for efficiency instead of measuring it directly. Molyneux (1993), on the other
hand, found insufficient evidence to support any of the theories in Turkish banking
for the same period. A study by G€unalp and C¸elik (2004) supported the efficient
structure hypothesis for the period 1990–2000, suggesting that banks earn higher
profits because their costs are lower. In other words, the most efficient banks yield
greater profits and market shares. Consequently, the market becomes more
concentrated.
The CA variable is found to have a positive and highly significant effect on profit-
ability, and its parameter is positive and significant at the 1% significance level in all
six estimates. As stated before, CA is defined as capital divided by total assets. A high
CA value indicates that a given brokerage house is less risky. The positive coefficient
of CA indicates that clients prefer less risky brokerage houses, as expected. A similar
relationship was found between the same variables for the Turkish banking sector in
studies by Okumus¸ (2002) and G€unalp and C¸elik (2004).
The coefficient of 1=TA; the inverse of total assets, is negative and bears a statis-
tical significance of 1%. The negative correlation between 1=TA and ROE implies a
positive relationship between TA and ROE: This suggests that large brokerage houses
are likely to benefit from economies of scale. Large brokerage houses could also be
perceived as less risky because they are more likely to offer a more diversified variety
of services. As explained above, low risk implies more clients. Studies on the Turkish
banking sector yield mixed results regarding the sign and the significance of the coef-
ficient of TA:
Finally, the coefficient of the growth rate of Borsa Istanbul trading volume
(GRTV) is found to be unexpectedly insignificant. This result is surprising; one would
expect a high growth rate to positively affect the profitability of brokerage houses
given that the Borsa Istanbul stock trading volume is generated solely by broker-
age houses.
7. Conclusion
This paper tests the hypotheses concerning the relationship between market structure
and performance by using a direct measure of efficiency for the brokerage houses
operating in Turkish capital markets. The direct measure of efficiency is calculated
from the estimation of a stochastic translog cost function. The profitability equation
of brokerage houses is specified with and without employing the direct measure of
efficiency. Each equation is then estimated by both the fixed-effects and the 2SLS
fixed effects models. The results from the regressions including the direct measure of
efficiency indicate that market share is the main determinant of profitability while
market concentration and efficiency are both insignificant. Therefore, the results give
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a strong support to the relative market power hypothesis for the Turkish broker-
age sector.
Thus, the findings suggest that brokerage houses with large market share might
use their market power to determine prices and make profits. This is not a surprising
result considering the fact that the brokerage houses with large market shares in
Turkey are able to earn significant amount of profits by engaging in and setting the
prices of activities other than stock trading, such as intermediation for public offer-
ing, corporate finance, and investment consultancy. There is no doubt that the legally
enforced barrier to entry that has been in force since 1997 has played an important
role in this finding as it has led to an increase in the market shares of existing
brokerage houses. Therefore, the regulatory authority should adopt policies to foster
competition in the market, for example, by lowering the legal as well as the other bar-
riers to entry or relying more on universal banking system in activities other than
intermediation for trading in securities.
Note
1. Due to data availability, our sample consists of 84 brokerage houses out of 104 in 2008,
87 brokerage houses out of 103 in 2009, 89 brokerage houses out of 103 in 2010, 97
brokerage houses out of 100 in 2011, 94 brokerage houses out of 100 in 2012, 95
brokerage houses out of 100 in 2013, 90 brokerage houses out of 97 in 2014, 90
brokerage houses out of 97 in 2014 and 83 brokerage houses out of 95 in 2014. The data
for 59 brokerage houses is available in all quarters from 2008 to 2015.
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